ALTHOUGH THE theology of grace has not been an area of great controZìi, versy in recent years, it has been the subject of a considerable amount of writing. In all of this writing there seems to be a certain tendency for each author to go off in a different direction, without much attention to the related efforts of others. It seems opportune, then, to survey the whole field of the theology of grace, to see what has been written of late, to try to discern the general direction in which theological thought is moving, to point out the problems which have arisen as a result of this movement, and to try to foresee the possibilities for future developments.
validity, these theories are clearly framed in terms of Scholastic metaphysics, not of modern philosophy or psychology; they have been aptly, if somewhat ungracefully, characterized as "ontologico-personal."
6 Something similar appears in Henri de Lubac's writings on the supernatural order: an emphasis on grace as personal, but a treatment in traditional Scholastic terms. Even Rahner's theory of the "supernatural existential" is based on considerations of nature and person and finality which are ontological rather than phenomenological.
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I do not mean to imply that there is something inferior about the ideas I have just mentioned, but only that there is something different about them; they are precursors of the new tendency rather than part of it. In the more current view, grace is personal not only because it is a gift from person to person but because it is a relationship between persons. This relationship is not so much defined (metaphysically) as it is described (phenomenologically). The important question to be asked is not about the essences of the persons involved but about the origin and development of the relationship between them.
Again, it should be noted that some writers on grace use an approach that is truly personalist in the fullest sense-but only sometimes and somewhat, not fully and consistently. The work of Flick and Alszeghy mentioned above incorporates some ideas on the relationship between God and man as interpersonal; but they do not use these ideas as the framework or as the keystone of their construction. Likewise, the volume on grace published by Baumgartner not long ago 8 drops a phrase here and there about love and friendship, but its general structure is that of a classical manual of dogmatic theology. Some of the best writing on grace as relationship was done by Küng in his study of Barth, 9 but the purpose of that study limited his discussion to certain aspects of the question. There are, however, a number of Roman Catholic theologians whose "personalism" is more fully and consistently developed. The best way to understand what is meant by personalism in this context is to examine their work.
An interesting example of development in this regard is provided by Karl Rahner. In his earlier article on the "supernatural existential" he suggested the need to rethink the theology of grace in terms of per sonal relations. In later articles he tends more and more to do just that: to speak of faith as humble surrender to God's love, of charity made possible by the realization of God's love. 10 In Sacramentum mundi he presents a brief synthetic view of grace as God's free self-communica tion, which is both healing and elevating, which is "actual" when offered to man to attract him, "habitual" when fully accepted, and so on. 11 Although he continues to use his "transcendental" method, along with Scholastic concepts (such as the "formal object" of faith), Rahner has become a sort of personalist with a phenomenological bent.
A treatment of grace similar to Rahner's was suggested some years ago by Juan Alfaro in a now classic article "Persona y gracia." 12 Man is defined as a finite spirit, or better, a created person, who seeks fulfil ment which he can only receive from an infinite, uncreated Person. Grace is primarily God's free gift of Himself to man; its effect is created grace-in the sinner, a mysterious inner call to personal union with God; in the justified man, a permanent disposition for an I-Thou rela tionship with God. Other aspects of grace, faith, hope, and charity are explained in terms of these basic principles. Alfaro also acknowledges the necessity of categories not drawn from the sphere of interpersonal relations: uncreated, created, finite, nature, and the like. In later arti cles he has related his personalist approach to revelation, Christology, and ecclesiology, thus approaching a more complete synthesis in per sonalist terms.
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At about the same time that Rahner and Alfaro were beginning to develop these ideas, Piet Fransen wrote a popular presentation of the theology of grace which remains one of the best of its kind.
14 Basing his exposition on scriptural passages (such as the parable of the prodigal son), he emphasized first the merciful love of God for man. Grace in man he described as an inner invitation to a "fundamental option" of love for God. Thus his treatment paralleled those of Rahner and Alfaro, but avoided some of the technical questions of speculative theology.
More recently, Fransen has written a much fuller treatment of the theology of grace, which I will discuss later.
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Perhaps the most erudite and impressive of the "personalist" theologies of grace is found in Heribert Mühlen's volumes on the Trinity and on ecclesiology. 16 Mühlen's analogy for the procession of the Spirit is Dietrich von Hildebrand's description of the communion of two persons who say to each other not only "I" and "Thou" but also "We." "I-Thou" and "We" express the two fundamental and distinct types of interpersonal relationships. The Holy Spirit unites the Father and the Son as the personal "We" spoken by both of them together; the Church, in which the anointing of Jesus' humanity by the Spirit is continued, draws men into this personal relationship: the Holy Spirit is the Person who is One in many persons. The effects of "personal" causality, such as that exercised by the Spirit, are (again following von Hildebrand) an impression of one person upon another, an intensification of the other's capacity for self-giving, an interpersonal union among those involved; Mühlen finds here an apt analogy for the grace of the Spirit.
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Another author, John Cowburn, has also offered a synthesis of Trinitarian theology and grace on the basis of a description of human love; but his synthesis is very different from Mühlen's. 18 He begins with a division of love into "cosmic" love, based on a similarity of nature between lover and loved, and ecstatic love, based on a personal act of commitment which is ultimately inexplicable, not based on reason. The distinct processions of Son and Spirit in the Trinity are explained in terms of these two types of love; so also are the love God manifests in creation and the supernatural, inexplicable love which He gives to the just. Cowburn draws his basic idea of the two kinds of love from a consideration of the discussions among the Scholastics about the nature of love, and supports it by numerous quotations from poets, philosophers, and mystics.
Still another description of grace in interpersonal categories is suggested in an article by Charles Meyer. 19 Love is described in Sartre's terms as "wanting to be loved," which seeks to "seduce" the otherthough without force or deceit-to "capture his subjectivity"; love is 16 Peter Fransen, The New Life of Grace (Tournai, 1969 Finally, we come again to Fransen, who has written the most recent and the fullest treatment of grace, somewhat along the lines of his earlier work but more thoroughly developed. 22 In this work Fransen be gins with scriptural considerations and makes them central throughout his book. For him, the key notion of grace is that of the presence within us of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Thus he tries to bring out the relationship between grace and the Trinity, as well as to stress the ecclesial dimensions of grace and to relate theology to psychological studies. In short, this is as close to a comprehensive view of grace as anything we have, and it attempts to do justice to all the exigencies of contemporary theological concerns.
Another author deserves mention before this list of "personalist" theologians is concluded. In his latest book Gregory Baum is concerned primarily with the doctrine of God, but he also treats of matters which have to do with the theology of grace. 23 Baum has made his method most explicit: it is the "application of a psychologically-oriented phe nomenology" to show that God is present in human life and experience. In his chapter on "redemptive immanence" he discusses explicit, con scious dialogue and the less-conscious experience of communion as two dimensions of life and growth in which a gratuitous, transforming gift is given to men-a gift which enables them to grow in openness and 20 James Mackey, The Grace of God t The Response of Man (Albany, 1966). 21 Ibid., pp. 39, 50, and 59. 22 Cf. η. 15 above. 23 Gregory Baum, Man Becoming: God in Secular Language (New York, 1970) . See especially the section titled "Redemptive Immanence," pp. 37-70. This section is one of the strongest, in my opinion, in a highly debatable book.
humanness. If we are aware of the ambiguities and evils of human life, Baum argues, we will realize that the possibility and reality of growth must depend on some "other" who is present to man. Baimi denies, then, that an emphasis on the immanence of God must lead to Pelagianism; on the contrary, the experience of love and friendship as always being gifts convinces us more strongly than ever that self-salvation is impossible; the divine love that is present in our lives can only be gratuitous. 24 A full-fledged theology of grace would require more space than Baum gives the subject in this book, but his approach is worth noting. Now the meaning of a "personalist" theology of grace should be seen more clearly. All the authors mentioned above are concerned with the person as a conscious subject-thinking, willing, acting-in relation to other conscious subjects, rather than with the person as supposition rationale. Their theology might be called "interpersonal," since they see the relationship between God and man not only as the matter to be explained by theology but as the very key to theological explanation. Although none of them rejects metaphysical analysis, they show more interest in phenomenological description of the grace relationship: rather than ask "Is love an act or a habitus?" they ask "How do human persons experience a love relationship?" They are led, then, to an interest in human psychology, to the study of human knowing and loving, and to a theological emphasis on faith, hope, and charity. Of course, these tendencies are present in all authors to some extent; what is characteristic of the authors listed here as "personalist" is that their theology is predominantly interpersonal, phenomenological, and psychological.
Besides these methodological characteristics, it may be well to summarize here the tendencies of recent writings on grace in regard to their content. One tendency is "theocentric": the merciful love of the Father is emphasized more than its effects on man; Uncreated Grace is given primacy over created grace. 25 Connected with this is the central place given to the person of Christ; special efforts are made to show how and why our relationship with God is through and in Christ. 26 An interest in the role of the Holy Spirit in the justification and sanctification of man is also evident in some of the authors mentioned, particularly in Mühlen. Another concern of contemporary theology is, of course, the communitarian nature of salvation; the Church is described 24 Aid., pp. 127 ff. 26 Cf., e.g., Alfaro, "Persona y gracia," p. 18; or Rahner's article in Sacramentum mundi. 26 Cf. Willig, op. cit. (η. 9 above); Alfaro, "Cristo, sacramento..." (η. 13).
as part of God's plan, pre-existent in the Word, to give His grace to man; or as the sacrament of Christ; or as the continuation of the anointing of Christ's humanity by the Spirit. 27 Finally, a desire, at least, has been expressed that the theology of grace and community should be integrated into an evolutionary world view.
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I doubt that anyone would quarrel with the tendencies toward renewal in content, toward a broadening of perspective, in our treatment of grace. But what is really new and distinctive in recent authors is the methodology which I have described as psychological, phenomenological, and interpersonal. It is this which distinguishes the contemporary theology of grace from that of Aquinas as sharply as Aquinas is set apart from Augustine. And it is this methodology, too, which has raised the most doubts and questions in the minds of observers. It is time, then, to consider some of the advantages and some of the problems of the movement which has been described.
THE PRESENT SITUATION: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS
Some of the advantages brought by this new trend of thought, some of the reasons it has developed, are fairly obvious. Catechists and preachers have long felt the need for an understanding of grace which could be adapted to kerygmatic purposes. When the only available synthesis was a metaphysical one, the education of priests and popular writing for the laity that were shaped by it failed to reach many of those to whom they were directed. Even the newer salvation-history pattern disappointed many catechists whose students found it remote and abstract. As Fransen's writing shows, a phenomenological theology can more easily meet this kerygmatic need.
But even on the level of speculative, technical theology there has been dissatisfaction with purely metaphysical categories. Hie relationship between nature and grace, the meaning of the divine Indwelling, the significance of Jesus Christ, and other aspects of grace may be understood fully only in terms of interpersonal relations.
Underlying even that reasoning is a still deeper question: that of the nature of theology as a science, of the relationship between theology and contemporary culture. The concrete, the individual, the existential, the experiential are no longer of concern to poets and artists only, but to scientists and philosophers as well. In modern psychology we have an example of a science which deals with the experiencing, think-ing, feeling, willing person as a conscious subject. Prior to this develop ment a personalist theology could not have been constructed; in the present world of thought its emergence is inevitable.
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Nevertheless, since the inception of the personalist trend, objections have been raised against it. That a recently developed approach to theology should encounter problems is no surprise, and no reason to cease moving forward; but forward movement at this point depends on facing and meeting the problems involved.
One set of problems occurs on the level of doctrinal orthodoxy. Ob viously, what is in question is not the orthodoxy of the personalist the ologians but the adequacy of personalist theology to express orthodox teaching. Thus Hermann Volk insisted some years ago that it is not sufficient simply to describe man's relationship with God: theologians must also define what man is; without the categories of essence and nature, Volk thought, the gratuity of the supernatural order could not be maintained. 30 The state of the question has changed since Volk wrote, but the question of the gratuity of grace remains a serious one for personalist theology. Another aspect of the same problem is appar ent in Johann Auer's criticism of Rahner's "Molinist" tendencies; God not only addresses us from without, He also works within us to produce our response; according to Auer, Rahner's view could lead to an over emphasis on Uncreated Grace. 31 Whether or not the criticism is valid for Rahner, it seems to be valid for some other writers. Emphasis on an I-Thou encounter between God and man can make us neglect the work of the Spirit within us-and that way lies Pelagianism. 32 Finally, even where no aspect of grace may be denied, some may be overlooked; adequate attention is not always paid to the effects of grace on man's body, on his historical existence, or on his relationships with other men in community. reality and gratuity of grace with the categories of "supernatural," "nature," "infinite," "creature," and the like. Within the framework of Scholastic metaphysics we felt safe and comfortable. Hie question now is: Can the same reality be adequately expressed in phenomenological terms, in a personalist framework?
To put the question another way: Is it possible to construct a theology of grace in purely personalist terms? Or can the new approach be only a useful supplement to the traditional syntheses? The majority of the authors I have mentioned would seem to hold that metaphysical and phenomenological approaches are both legitimate and complementary. Unfortunately, many have apparently not faced the methodological question clearly and explicitly, so that "complementary" means different things to different thinkers. 34 Mackey, for example, suggests that there are some marginal problems in the theology of grace which cannot be treated phenomenologically, such as the justification of infants by baptism. Auer would apparently give equal weight to ontological, phenomenological, and ethical considerations in the explanation of grace. Alfaro, in using ontological categories in his definition of "created person," renounces the possibility of a purely phenomenological personalism. Flick and Alszeghy use personalist ideas within a salvationhistory framework. In short, most authors do not believe it is possible to be entirely consistent in the construction of a personalist theology on a phenomenological basis. Gregory Baimi is perhaps the outstanding exception in this regard; whether or not his efforts are ultimately judged successful, he at least tries to apply his methodology consistently and thoroughly. I am not arguing that metaphysics and ontology are opposed, that one author ought not to use two approaches, but only that it might be better to recognize that the approaches are two, are distinct, and should not be intermingled. Talk of "interpersonal encounter" cannot plug the gaps of an incomplete metaphysical analysis, nor should reference to a "mysterious ontological change" be used to obscure the difficulty of describing the psychological effect of infant baptism. Neither old patches on new garments nor new patches on old ones are entirely satisfactory. If we cannot as yet give a totally adequate account of grace in phenomenological terms, then we have more work to 34 Besides the authors mentioned in this paragraph, we might note the following statement of Schillebeeckx: "this living communion with God (though it cannot be fully expressed in terms of relationships of cause and effect) does not fall outside God's universal causality
TTiis explains the necessity of the gratia creata as an ontological implication of the reciprocity in grace between God and ourselves. The mere 'phenomenology' of the 'encounter' cannot account for this" (Revelation and Theology 2, 109, n. 1). The same point is made by Auer and accepted by Alfaro, but it seems quite far removed from the viewpoint of Mackey or Baum. do-which is a different conclusion than that personalism can never by itself be a satisfactory basis for theology.
There are, no doubt, many reasons for the methodological problem. One is that the theology of grace depends on the theology of divine transcendence, and the latter is one of the greatest unresolved problems in Catholic theology today. Baum attacks this problem in the book referred to above. I should like to point out another and, after explaining it, suggest a possible solution to it.
The Mûhlen's description of the "we-experience," taken from von Hildebrand, seems to represent such a study. However, it is questionable whether the analogy between this phenomenon and the theology of the Holy Spirit, as Mühlen develops it, will bear all the weight that he puts on it-whether this analogy really explains and clarifies as much as Mühlen says it does. Be that as it may, the explanation of the effects of personal love which Mühlen gives is certainly not all that could be said about such effects; in this respect, at least, a more complete phenomenology could add to our understanding of grace.
Cowburn's starting point raises even more doubts. His philosophical discussion of "cosmic" and "ecstatic" love ignores the possibility of a third and higher type, based neither on natural affinity nor arational impulse: the generous and yet reasonable response to another person as other. Cowburn intersperses his arguments with many quotations from literary sources, but this is no substitute for careful study and analysis of our actual experience of human relations-and this, it seems to me, is what is lacking in Cowburn's approach.
Meyer's position is harder to evaluate, since he does not fully work out its implications. However, his quotations from Sartre and Jung present a rather pessimistic picture of human love, almost a description of what "love" can become where grace is not present. This kind of love does not sound like "self-giving" or "self-communication," and one wonders if it can serve as an analogy for the love of God.
Fransen and Baimi both make considerable use of illustrations and analogies drawn from our everyday experience of human relationships. Neither, however, develops his notions of interpersonal relations in a systematic way. Fransen relies on scriptural parables (such as that of Ezekiel 16) and on commonplace experiences for many of his examples. Baimi has been influenced more by contemporary psychotherapy and personalist philosophy. In each case the result is pleasing-easy to read and understand, apparently sensible and coherent. Yet one might wish for a more systematic explanation of and more critical reflection upon the structure of human experience which we use as an analogy for grace. Both Baum and Fransen exhibit admirable insight into that experience, and both have obviously reflected upon its meaning and use in theology. It would be helpful if they were more explicit about the source of their reflections.
Although I have my own preferences among the theories I have discussed, my point is not simply that some are superior to others. My point is that the whole problem of how to create a superior theory needs some consideration. Just as one cannot build a sound metaphysical theology on a weak metaphysics, so one cannot construct an adequate phenomenological theology on an inadequate understanding of human relations. We might, indeed, presume that everyone knows about human relationships-except that the simple listing of theories above has shown how divergent are the explanations given by theologians of such a basic concept as love.
I have been trying to show that a radically new approach to grace has emerged in the past decade; that this development has been good and necessary, but that it is not without problems; and that those problems are both doctrinal and methodological. The chief doctrinal problem would seem to be that of safeguarding the transcendence and gratuity of grace. Since it has been difficult to express this transcendence and gratuity accurately, the question has arisen: Can we ever have an adequate theology of grace in purely personalist terms? I have suggested that one crucial problem in developing such a theology (not the only problem, but a crucial one) is the proper understanding of human relations. It would be impossible, and perhaps undesirable, to achieve a complete consensus among theologians as to the best source for such an understanding, the best model for the theology of grace. But unless theologians have some reasonably satisfactory basis for their syntheses, they will always be prey to a double danger: on the one hand, failure to express adequately all the facets of our faith in God's love for us; on the other, a superficiality and shallowness which could leave our theology doctrinally unobjectionable but intellectually uninteresting. To the problem of an adequate phenomenological model I will address myself in the remainder of this essay.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT: SOME SUGGESTIONS
Positively, the question facing us is how to retain and exploit the advances of recent years. Negatively, the question is how to avoid or overcome the difficulties we have encountered. Some of the suggestions I will offer in this section are fairly obvious and should be easily acceptable; others may reflect my own personal preferences and interests; I offer the latter to suggest possibilities, to raise questions, and perhaps to express my own* hopes for the future direction of the theology of grace. This theology can best be developed, I believe, by deeper contact with the tradition of the past, by closer connection with other aspects of theology today, and by more profound reflection on human experience.
The usefulness of more careful study of our theological tradition should be fairly obvious. We do not need to jettison Augustine and Aquinas; we need rather to translate them into our own language; this would scarcely need to be said were it not for the negative tone used by some "personalista" (e.g., Mackey) toward metaphysics. I have been arguing that the classical and contemporary approaches are complementary, not contradictory. This means more than that we should speak of the dead with reverence. It means that the struggles of the past are instructive for us today. Augustine, for example, only learned in his later years to express unequivocally the gratuity of God's grace; his earlier commentaries on the epistles of Paul were not sufficiently clear in this regard. More than eight hundred years later Aquinas had to go through a similar "deepening" process in his understanding of God's free initiative in saving man. 35 If we cannot totally avoid their earlier mistakes, we ought at least to be able to learn from them. When we understand what it was that they were struggling to express and why they had such difficulty with it, we will be better able to express that same reality in our contemporary, "personalist" terms. Again, this means recognizing not the opposition but the distinction between the classical and the personalist approaches. Crossbreeding the two will produce not a hardy hybrid but a sterile mutant. Listening to the past, not in order to repeat it but in order to learn from it, will help us to develop our own phenomenological theology of grace.
It should be equally clear that the theology of grace must develop in close relationship with the other aspects of theology. Our understanding of our relationship with God depends on our understanding of God, and especially of the meaning of divine transcendence. It is the difficulty of expressing transcendence in personalist terms that has made some theologians hesitant to adopt a thoroughly personalist approach; and it is Baum's merit that he has seen this problem clearly and attacked it directly. human action pointed the way to a greater appreciation of divine transcendence. In a similar way, our reflection on the phenomenon of sin and conversion can lead us to a realization both of God's transcendence and of His immanence. 38 Thus the theology of transcendence and the theology of grace can and should develop together. Another very closely connected branch of theology is pneumatology. As the theology of the presence of God in man, this area of thought ought to be brought into contact with the theology of grace too; and the need for this has been so often expressed that we may hope that some fruitful future work will be done along these lines. 39 A third instance of a theological concern relevant to the theology of grace is that of the recent interest in eschatology. Theologians were just beginning to esplicitate the connection between grace and classical eschatology 40 when the new version of eschatology appeared on the scene. It is evident that those concerned with the theology of grace cannot ignore this new development. Through reflection on all three of these areastranscendence, the theology of the Spirit, and eschatology-our understanding of grace in personalist terms can be broadened and deepened.
Having conversion; what we need to be aware of is our own experience of sin, of doubt, of faith, of prayer, of the presence and absence of God. I do not suggest that theology must always be written in terms of personal witness, but that the theologian's own personal Christianity must somehow be expressed in his writing on grace. And, indeed, such expression is found more and more in the writings of "academic" theologians. The more recent writings of Rahner, for example, or Fransen's latest book could evidently not have been composed by men who were not themselves Christians or who had not reflected on their own Christian experience. With Baum, this experiential approach becomes an explicit methodology.
Experience, of course, is not enough to make a man a theologian. Experience must somehow be reflected upon, absorbed, understood, conceptualized, and expressed in a coherent manner, if it is to be useful in theological work. It is at this point that we can and should turn to others, to nontheologians, for help. I have mentioned above, in discussing the problems of personalist theology today, some of the various sources to which theologians have turned for analogies, for phenomenological models of the grace-relationship: they have made use of classical philosophers, of contemporary (especially existentialist) philosophers, of poets and novelists, and, last but not least, of psychologists. Undoubtedly theologians will continue to derive useful suggestions from all these sources. Here I wish to call attention to one particular source which will, I believe, be of increasing importance to theologians: contemporary psychology.
Several times already I have mentioned Gregory Baum as one whose thinking has been strongly influenced by humanistic psychology; I doubt that many will be totally satisfied by Baum's conclusions, but, I would argue, that does not mean that his approach is all wrong. Even more explicitly psychological in orientation is William Meissner's attempt to delineate an "image of man" acceptable to the contemporary psychologist and to the theologian as well. 43 Meissner's results, too, are tentative, incomplete, imperfect-yet his attempt is in itself stimulating. Fransen also could be mentioned as one whose work shows the effects of psychological influence, even though his method is less explicitly dependent on psychology than Baum's. Protestant theologians, particularly Paul Tillich, have been even more influenced by psychology than Catholics. 44 In short, a number of theologians have already found in modern psychology a useful source for the development of a phenomenology of interpersonal relations which can be analogously applied to our relationship with God. The help given by psychology is not that of substituting for our personal experience of the Christian life, but of clarifying, organizing, and expressing that experience. If we are to exploit this source more fully, we shall have to study it more intensively and use it more systematically; we shall have to give increased attention to the writings of psychologists and to the scope, limits, and methods of their work. Then, I suggest, the future progress of theology can continue along the lines it has been following in recent years: toward a more solidly based and more systematically worked-out phenomenological, psychological, personalist theology of grace. At this point I have already passed over from prognostication by extrapolation from existing tendencies to expression of personal preferences and hopes. For me, the study of psychology, particularly humanistic, phenomenological psychology, has been of great help in understanding the theology of grace. I hope that this resource will be of benefit to Catholic theologians in general, even more in the future than it has been in the past. In what follows I would like to give a brief description of precisely what is meant by "humanistic, phenomenological psychology" and offer some examples of how psychologists can be of help to theologians. By "humanistic" or "phenomenological" psychology I mean that current or tendency in American psychology which is called the "third force," in contrast with the psychoanalytic and behaviorist schools. scribe carefully many aspects of interpersonal relationships, their writings on psychology are rich resources for a phenomenology of grace. The following three examples may suggest both the style of "humanistic psychology" and its relevance to our theology.
One of the authors mentioned above, Rollo May, has received wide attention since the publication of his Love and Will. 46 The relationship of this work to theological subjects is evident even from a glance at the table of contents: "Love and Death... Love and the Daimonic... Intentionality... Communion of Consciousness." Looking more closely, one sees that May is discussing the distinctions between "wish," "will," "intentionality," and "freedom," giving examples of each from his experience as a psychotherapist. 47 Now theologians have for some time been discussing precisely these same realities, and have developed the category of "fundamental option" or "basic choice" as a conceptual tool to clarify the relationship between grace, freedom, and human action. 48 This concept has been of tremendous value in the theology of grace. When, however, one considers it more closely, one discovers that theologians have considerable difficulty in saying exactly what this "fundamental option" is, to what human experience it corresponds; it is much easier to give an abstract definition of the term than to describe the reality concretely. May, on the other hand, does not use the term "fundamental option," but it is clear that his "intentionality" is at least analogous to it. Theologians, I suggest, could learn a great deal by studying the examples which May takes from clinical psychology, and by rethinking the notion of "fundamental option" in the light of the experiences he describes. 49 Less well known, but equally worthy of consideration, is Abraham Maslow's study of the "psychology of being." 50 Of the many interesting themes in the book, one may be singled out: the recurring contrast of "Being-love" and "Being-cognition" with "deficiency-love." In the section of this paper on the different phénoménologies of interpersonal relationships used by different theologians, I pointed out the lack of 46 agreement on just what sort of "love" should be used as an analogue for divine love. For Maslow, "Being-love" is the highest form of human love. It results not from one person's inadequacy and craving for affection from another, but from a secure sense of personal worth; it is an overflowing of one's love and esteem for oneself into love and esteem for others. One would have to read Maslow's entire study to appreciate the richness of his development of this notion. I want at this point only to suggest that reflection on his description of love might serve as a good starting point for consideration of the generous outpouring of God's love of Himself to man.
Phenomenological psychology may supply us, not only with descriptions of particular factors in interpersonal relationships, but with a conceptual schema or framework which can serve as a model for understanding the entire process of justification, conversion, and growth in grace. I am thinking here of Carl Rogers' theory of the therapeutic relationship and of growth-producing relationships in general. 51 According to Rogers, the necessary and sufficient conditions for effective psychotherapy are a certain set of attitudes in the therapist and the perception of these attitudes by the client; when these conditions are present, the client tends to change in fairly well-defined (and in fact measurable) ways. The attitudes or qualities which are helpful in the therapist are called "congruence" (authenticity, honesty, realness), "unconditional acceptance" (caring for the other person no matter what his behavior may be), and "empathie understanding" (a felt appreciation of the other's feelings). These attitudes are communicated and perceived on a variety of levels: explicit, implicit, conceptual, experiential, conscious, subliminal. The person who experiences this kind of relationship tends to become more "congruent" and more accepting himself, to move towards greater self-understanding, self-reliance, and acceptance of self and others. Rogers has described all of this in considerable detail and has conducted research to seek verification of his hypothesis that this is indeed an adequate description of the therapeutic relationship. What is significant for us as theologians is that each element in this picture of a growth-relationship has its analogue in the traditional theology of justification. 52 The authenticity and acceptance of the "effective thera- pist" are analogous to the unfeigned and unmerited love of God for man. To the multiple levels of communication between therapist and client correspond the diverse modes of God's revelation of His love to man. Between self-understanding and faith, between self-reliance and hope, between acceptance-of-self-and-others and charity-in short, between the outcomes of effective therapy and the elements of the process of justification-striking similarities can be traced. In other words, Rogers' "theory of therapy" can provide a framework for a phenomenological theology of justification.
A good deal more thought needs to be given to the whole question of the use of psychological models in theology. The very basic meaning of analogical predication of human concepts about God, the fundamental questions of theological methodology, are involved here. I do not pretend to have solved these questions. I have wished simply to suggest one possible line of development, one way in which our theology of grace can be given greater intelligibility and coherence. The examples I have given in the last few pages are only that-examples. They are meant to illustrate a point which can be stated very briefly in summarizing this whole article.
Our theology of grace has tended in recent years to become increasingly personalistic, phenomenological, and psychological. In this movement numerous problems have been encountered, not least of which is the difficulty of understanding and conceptualizing the human relationships which serve as analogies for our relationship with God. Considerable help can be derived, in my opinion, from contemporary phenomenological psychology. Through greater contact with tradition, with other areas of theology, and with human experience, we may all grow in that limited but fruitful understanding of our relationship with God which is the goal of the theology of grace.
